Introduction
When there has been a heavy fall of rain on a newly made and newly grassed football field, you do not chase two football teams on to it to play a match.
These homely but profound remarks were addressed to our small delegation during 1994 when we were visiting Hungary to study its recently adopted new Constitution and its young Constitutional Court. The Hungarian Constitution and its Constitutional Court were then but five years old. The remarks were made by the leader of the opposition in the Hungarian national legislature. This wise, seasoned political campaigner had been criticising some of the recent judgments of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and his remarks were intended to impress on us that, whatever his criticisms might be, he had a deep commitment to the new constitutional state and its independent institutions and that the latter should never be harmed for the sake of political or other gain. Our own Constitution, and the constitutional democracy it guarantees, is also a newly planted field, little more than five years old.
In this paper I propose noting first some of the features of modern constitutionalism and the paradoxes to which they give rise. I then discuss the need for independent constitutional institutions, the substantive independence necessary for their proper functioning and areas where they require special support. I conclude with some observations on the paradox of judicial review, appropriate checks and balances on courts exercising judicial review and the vital importance of distinguishing between honest and informed criticism of judgments and judges and the undermining of the judiciary as a constitutional institution.
Constitutionalism
"Constitutional democracy" connotes a development in the concept of democracy which began towards the end of the eighteenth century but which has gained more universal recognition only in the last 50 years. On the one hand, constitutional democracy recognises the ancient democratic principle that government of a country is based on and legitimated by the will and consent of the governed (or more accurately the will and consent of the majority of the governed), which is determined by regular multi-party elections based on universal adult franchise. On the other hand, constitutional democracy limits this principle by making the democratically elected government and the will of the majority subject to a written constitution and the norms embodied in it, which constitution is enshrined as the supreme law of the country in question. An almost universal feature of modern constitutionalism is a Bill of Rights which forms part of the Constitution and which is designed to protect and enforce individual rights principally, although not exclusively, against the state. The concept of a constitutional democracy, for which the short-hand expression "constitutionalism" is sometimes used, is a radical one, the full implications of which are not always readily appreciated. It transforms the regulation of the state and those living in it from a political exercise which in principle can be, and in practice sometimes is, value free and dictated by the majority, to one which is shaped and ruled, both directly and indirectly, by the Constitution and its underlying norms and values. In a constitutional state, the politics of governance can never again be a merely pragmatic enterprise aimed exclusively at achieving the various goals comprising the government's electoral mandate. Governance is now subject to the An invariable consequence of constitutionalism is the tension between the will of the majority, and its representatives, on the one hand, and the normative control of the Constitution, exercised through the courts and other institutions, on the other. This tension, one might even call it a paradox, cannot ever be completely or permanently resolved, an inevitability which is, as yet, inadequately appreciated and I will touch on it later in this paper.
The Need for Independent Institutions
The South African Constitution has clearly designated the judiciary as the prime upholder and enforcer of the Constitution. While prescribing certain constitutional functions for all courts, the Constitution has conferred a special role in this regard on the Constitutional Court. There are particular historical and fundamental jurisprudential reasons for this which fall outside the ambit of this paper. Apart from those matters in respect of which it has exclusive jurisdiction, The Constitution has, however, gone further in its commitment to strengthening and entrenching constitutionalism and, drawing on the often sad experiences of young democracies in the past, wisely makes provision for a variety of independent state institutions whose purpose is to "strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic". 
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One may legitimately ask why it is necessary to make provision for these additional independent institutions. The object is clearly stated by the Constitution in relation to the independent state institutions referred to in section 181 and is to be inferred for the others, namely, to strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic. From a 4 S 167(3)(b) and (c). 5 S 167 (3)(c). 6 S 167(7). 7 S 39(2) read with ss 173 and 167(7). 8 S 181(1). 9 S 155(3)(b). 10 S 220. 11 S 224(2).
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functional point of view this purpose, once stated, strikes one as obvious. Yet it is a truism not always appreciated. The remarkable success of our 1994 and 1999 elections, in the sense that they were substantially free and fair and were accepted as legitimate by the overwhelming majority of the electorate across all political boundaries, can only be ascribed to the competent functioning of the Electoral Commission, whose independence has been guaranteed by both the 1993 and 1996
Constitutions and which was jealously asserted by the Electoral Commission itself.
We tend to take this for granted, forgetting in the process how many emerging democracies have stumbled at the hurdle of their first elections, because the results are not accepted as true or legitimate by a suspicious and newly liberated electorate.
In my view the significance of these institutions goes even deeper. A homely metaphor has on occasion been used to describe the Constitution as comprising the building blocks for a constitutional democracy, but it warns that they need a pervading human rights ethos to act as the mortar binding these blocks securely together; without such mortar, the structure will remain unstable and liable to topple in severe 
Substantive Independence of these Institutions
In relation to the judiciary and the other independent state institutions to which reference has been made, the Constitution makes explicit provision for their protection and thereby indirectly for the development of these habits of
constitutionalism. The independence, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts are protected both by negative and positive injunctions in the Constitution.
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The courts are stated to be independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law; no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts; and organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness.
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Likewise the independent state institutions mentioned are declared by the Constitution to be independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law;
other organs of state are obliged by the Constitution, through legislative and other measures, to protect them and to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness, and no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of these institutions.
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The protection and support given to these institutions by the Constitution, is very similar to that given to the courts. One important distinction is to be noted. In the case of the courts the Constitution provides that they "are subject only to the Constitution and the law" and no provision is made for them to be accountable to any other organ of state or any other institution or person for that matter. If the term accountability is applicable at all to the courts, about which I have substantial reservations, then courts are "accountable" only to the Constitution and the law, both directly through the Constitution and indirectly through the judicial oath of office. A judge (that is to say a judicial officer on the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Courts and the courts of a similar status to the High Courts) may only be removed from office if such judge "suffers from an incapacity, is grossly incompetent or is guilty of gross misconduct", has been found as a fact to fall into one or more of those categories by the Judicial Services Commission and a resolution of the National Assembly adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members has called for such judge's removal. Provided, therefore, that a judge does not suffer from incapacity, is not grossly incompetent and is not guilty of gross misconduct, she or he is not accountable to any organ of state. By contrast, the independent institutions envisaged in section 181 are expressly made accountable to the National Assembly and are obliged to report on their activities and 12 See s 165(2), (3) and (4). 13 13 Id.
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the performance of their functions to the Assembly at least once a year. Substantive independence of the courts as required by the Constitution implies much, but chiefly it connotes three things. Firstly, the training and ethical fibre of judges must be such that they can and will be beholden only to the Constitution and its values in performing their judicial duties and not be influenced by other considerations and pressures. Secondly, the judiciary must enjoy reasonable financial security and adequate working conditions in order to attract candidates to judicial office with the requisite training and ethical fibre and also in order to remove the need and temptation, once they are appointed, to look elsewhere in order to maintain an adequate standard of living and in so doing risk sacrificing their independence.
Thirdly, their independence must be effectively protected by the Constitution so that no-one, whether within or outside state structures, is able to interfere improperly with the discharge of their duties. In order for all these aspects of judicial independence to be achieved, the courts require adequate financial and administrative resources.
Crucial in this regard is that 14 S 181(2) -(4). 15 S 181(5).
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the process whereby these resources are supplied and controlled should reinforce the independence of the courts and not undermine it. In pursuance of its obligations under section 165(4) of the Constitution, 16 Which obliges all organs of state, through legislative and other measures to "assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts."
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Quite clearly Parliament must, even in a constitutional state, control the budgetary processes and expenditure of departments of state and also of the judicial arm of the state. As far as the latter is concerned, this is a sensitive area in the terrain of the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary which requires the greatest circumspection and regard for comity between them. The Constitutional
Court must not intrude, or be seen to intrude on the fiscal and financial powers of Parliament.
17
At the same time Parliament must execute these powers in conformity with all its obligations under the Constitution and not in a way which will harm the independence of the judiciary. The same is true of the relationship between the judiciary and the executive in regard to the administration and functioning of the courts. In areas where the contours of these relationships are not spelt out in legislation, and perhaps cannot easily be spelt out, there is need for sound habits and practices of constitutionalism to develop as soon as possible.
Where These Institutions Need Particular Support
For a number of reasons it has been difficult for these habits and practices to develop. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the transition to a constitutional democracy is proving to be slower, more complex and more difficult than initially contemplated and that the coming into operation of the 1996 Constitution did not complete this final stage, it merely introduced it. While this may be a sobering thought, it also reminds us of how thankful we ought to be for the great deal which has already been achieved with relatively little bloodshed and it focuses our attention on the importance of what still has to be done. The process of changing from a racist oligarchy to a constitutional democracy has presented legal, technical, logistic and resource problems which would have been daunting for a country with financial and other resources many times greater than South Africa's. The extent to which and the complexity with which institutionalised apartheid had invaded the legal fabric of society has been underestimated. When the interim Constitution, as it was obliged to do, at one and the same time imploded the existing provincial and local government structures and replaced them with structures which could only take effect Any law which is inconsistent with the Constitution became invalid, at the latest, when the 1996 Constitution came into effect.
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There is an obligation on government to ensure that such invalidity does not leave a lacuna in the law, The Court emphasised the importance of both financial and administrative independence:
[I]t is necessary to make a distinction between two factors, both of which ... are relevant to "independence". The first is "financial independence". This implies the ability to have access to funds reasonably required to enable the Commission to discharge the functions it is obliged to perform under the 
(Emphasis supplied)
These are general principles applicable to the independence and function of all independent institutions.
The Paradox of Judicial Review and Appropriate Checks and Balances
The tension or paradox which constitutionalism creates manifests itself most sharply in the relationship between the Constitutional Court and the other two arms of the state at national level, because it is the Constitutional Court which, in the final instance determines whether the actions of the legislature and the executive are consistent with the Constitution and, if not, invalidates them. For the Constitutional Court, in this context, to fulfil its role as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution it must be independent, not only of these organs of state, but also of the political majority. Its members cannot be elected, because that would imply that the Court owed an allegiance or accountability to the political majority or other elector in question. On the other hand, it is seen as undemocratic for a body which is not elected to be in a position to overrule the expressed will of the political representatives of the majority. This paradox, although particularly striking in the case of the Constitutional Court, exists in respect of all our courts and makes the method of appointing judicial officers particularly important in order to ensure at the same time, and as far as this is practically possible, both their independence and their legitimacy. This brings me to the point I want to stress particularly. The judiciary is not, and ought not to be seen as, an arm of the state which has been exempted from all 27 Id pars 98-99.
14/95 checks and balances. At the same time it is important, particularly so for the general public, to appreciate that the checks and balances on the judiciary are not the same as in the case of the legislature and the executive. In the case of the latter the checks and balances are principally through the Constitution, as enforced by the courts, and through the political process. In the case of the courts these checks and balances cannot be through the political process, for this would undermine the independence of the judiciary, which in turn would seriously undermine the judiciary's crucial function of being a check on the legislature and executive. It is therefore unfortunate that the expression "accountability" has been used in relation to the judiciary, for it suggests, wrongly and misleadingly, that the checks and balances on the judiciary are political in nature.
At the same time I should like to stress, as clearly as I can, that the judiciary is not, and does not regard itself as being, above the Constitution or exempt from checks and balances. It must at the same time be appreciated that the checks and balances on the judiciary are different and in most cases also operate indirectly. Their main features seem to me to be the following: anyone who cares to do so. There is no limit to such criticism, provided it does not misrepresent the content or conclusions of the judgment, the facts or the law on which it is based or wrongly ascribes dishonest or improper motives to the court which has delivered the judgment. Critical rationalism is, I believe, the best and safest method of arriving at the truth generally, which is one of the reasons why freedom of expressions is such a fundamental liberty. Critical rationalism is no less important in applying and developing the law and keeping a check on those who perform this function.
(c) Third, provision is made for the judgments of all courts (except those of the Constitutional Court and those of the Supreme Court of Appeal in matters which are not of a constitutional nature, in the sense already described) to be taken on appeal to a higher court where they can be corrected. Courts of appeal have never hesitated to correct judgments, where this is warranted, nor to criticise judicial officers where they have acted incorrectly or behaved improperly.
(d) Fourth, in the case of the Constitutional Court in particular, from which there is no further appeal, the opportunity, I would even call it a constitutional duty, for public scrutiny and criticism becomes all-important as a safeguard. The efficacy of informed and rational public scrutiny and criticism, as a means of legitimately "checking" judicial conduct, especially of the highest courts, must not be underestimated, particularly not in a constitutional state which has made the radical shift away from the Westminster parliamentary supremacy of the past.
On the assumption that the appointment and promotion procedures work adequately, the judges on the highest courts, through their training and experience, will have become steeped in the habits of rational analysis, argument, criticism and hypothesis formation. This will have become an integral, I would venture to say an inseparable, part of their legal thinking. Few judges would confess to actually liking criticism, but the better informed and the more rationally structured criticism is, the less these judicial habits are able to resist following the arguments. Criticism which is based, whether intentionally or not, on a false substratum of fact or law, is counterproductive. If public debate is regularly premised on such false substratum, whoever might be responsible for supplying it, the natural tendency is to ignore such debate as unreliable and in this way the good is lost with the bad.
(e) Fifth, in extreme cases judges may be removed from office for incapacity, gross incompetence and gross misconduct in the manner already alluded to.
(f) Lastly, the Constitution makes provision for national legislation to provide for procedures for dealing with complaints about judicial officers. Such legislation will have to comply with the Constitution and not interfere with judicial independence itself. There is no reason to think that procedures cannot be devised which, while not harming judicial independence, can deal appropriately with judicial misconduct so as to be an effective check on unconstitutional judicial actions. Attention is already being given to such legislation.
While informed and rational criticism of the judiciary performs an important constitutional function, the deliberate undermining of this indispensable independent institution comes close to treason. While judges are not sacrosanct, the institution which they serve is. By and large, following the exemplary lead given by President give the President the power to amend the LGTA by proclamation.
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The President, relying on section 16A and legal advice he had been given, purported to amend the
LGTA by means of two proclamations. The matter was politically sensitive and had The implication of the allegations against all ten members of the Court was stated in the recusal judgment to be -... that the ten members of this Court had created the impression that they had already decided to uphold the appeal of the President at a time when the record had not been filed and before argument on behalf of any of the parties had been heard. Having so decided, the further consequence of this impression was that they made interlocutory rulings aimed at upholding the President's appeal. The suggestion that a court, without having seen the record or heard argument, would engineer its interlocutory rulings to favour a decision it had already taken, is extraordinary and contemptuous.
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In the judgment on the merits the following was said of similar tactics:
29 The President of the Republic of South Africa v The South African Rugby Football Union CCT 16/98. The first Constitutional Court judgment (the forum judgment) is reported in 1999 (2) BCLR 175 (CC), the second (the recusal judgment) is reported in 1999 (7) BCLR 725 (CC) and the third (the judgment on the merits) was delivered on 10 September 1999 but, as at the date of drafting this paper, had not yet been reported. 30 The judgment on the merits, above n 29 at par 251.
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The tactics adopted by Dr Luyt bear the hallmark of spin-doctoring by a respondent who, knowing that the appeal might succeed, lays the ground to discredit the Court with the object of undermining a decision which might go against him. The appellants might succeed, but it would be a pyrrhic victory, secured by a dishonest President from a compliant Court.
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For the sake of constitutionalism, it is essential to distinguish between, on the one hand, honest and informed criticism of the judgments and behaviour of judges and, on the other, conduct calculated to undermine the judiciary as an institution.
One of the reciprocal obligations which a constitutional democracy imposes on all its subjects is to support the independent constitutional institutions, as constitutional institutions, not only vocally at the level of intellectual abstraction, but by actively working to establish the habits of constitutionalism in all societal structures and societal interaction. Our constitutional playing fields are well constructed and planted, but require careful tending. 
